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SPEECH  BY  CHRISTOPHER  TUGENDHAT,  MEMBER  OF  THE  EEC  COMMISSION 
WITH  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  BUDGETS  AND  PERSONNEL,  TO  THE  ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE  OF  THE  DAIRY  TRADE  fEDERATION,  EASTBOURNE  : 
24  APRIL  1978,  09.40 hrs. 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen  : 
The  theme  of this  Conference is the value of milk~  You 
have  already heard this morning Mr.  John Peyton address  you  on 
its value to Britain.  Othe~ eminent speakers are addres$ing 
you later on other areas of value.  M~ task is .to say  so~ething 
from  the point of view of the European Community  as  a  wb~e. 
The  dairy sector is, in economic  terms,  by  far the most 
important single sector of Community  agriculture.  It accounts 
for practically 20%  of the value of final  agricultural production 
in the Community.  Owners  of dairy herds  in the  Community,  of 
wham  there are 2.2  millio~represent more  than a  third qf the 
total number  of people self·empioyed in Community  agriculture, 
and  abmit  a  quarter of total fl,gricultural  emplo~ent. 
The  UK  currently produ~es about  13~% of the Commupity's 
milk- only about half the share of· Germany  (27%)  or Frapce  (24%), 
but rather more  than the UK's  share of total Community 
agricultural production  (11,8%)~  In other words  while  t~e UK 
is not among  the most  important  Community  milk  producers~  the 
milk sector is rather more  important in UK  agriculture  t~an in 
Community  agriculture as  a  whole. 
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:t:.The  Bri  ti$h are,  of  ~ourse, important consumers  of 
milk and milk products.  UK  consumption per head of mil~ £Its 
is exceeded only in Ireland,  •nd of milk proteins  only tn 
Denmark  and ·the Netherlands,· This is of great  importanc-~in 
a  Community  with a  milk surplus.  The  British prominenc' among 
Community  consumers  of milk is of course largely due  to the 
famous  British appetite for  l•i"quid' milk - the daily pinta - of 
which the British consumer appears  to drink roughly twice as 
many  as  the average  COIIliiiUtlt by.>'eonsumer.  One  of the majot" 
considerations in the Commission's  proposal  to the Council  of 
Ministers  to authorise the continued existence of the  UK  Milk 
Marketing Boardswas the:bellef that this  ~ould help to main-
tain tl'le  high level of liqdl"Ci  consumption in the UK,  thereby 
avoiding higher production ofd)'(.ltter  and~:~sktmmed milk pc)wder 
for which  the only outlet fJbu18  be intervention.  In mak~ng its 
proposal ·the Commiss·ion  was !,_.lil: aware  that  sev~ral MCI1lb~r 
States regard  markett:nw:~boa,l:'dtltH as  a  radical,  and  indeed \In-
acceptable,  dep·arture ·-·  .We  ~t1.eve our proposal  to be th• 
right one,· but we  reco·gnise·•. tbat to get it accepted will 
require· a.major  effort·.or~r Q\JrFpart •. 
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In the UK,  the  C~nity's dairy policy is all  to~ 
often associated in people's  ~nds with the so-called  bu~ter 
and milk powder mountains.  It is true that intervention 
stocks of surplus agricultural products were  almost unknQwn 
in the UK  before accession to the  Community,  at least since 
the introduction of standard quantities of milk.  This  w~s 
not because those responsible for agricultural policy in the 
UK  were necessarily more  virtuous  than policy-makers  elsewhere, 
but simply a  reflection of the fact that the UK  was  a 
substantial net importer of  pr~ctically all foodstuffs,  ~hough 
it did,  and still does,  have  substantial periodic surplu$es of 
potatoes.  Obviously surpluses  tend to pile up in the hands  of 
exporters,  not of importers,  Thus  the  Community  of Nine,  with 
a  higher degree of  self-suffi~iency than the UK  on its own, 
and given the vagaries of harvests  and world  tr~ding opp~rtunities 
will inevitably sometimes  find itself with more  on its  ~nd than 
people want  to eat. 
I 
I  should stress that the Community  is by  no  means  alone 
in this situation.  The  USA,  for example,  has  for years 
regularly held vast stocks of grain,. the disposal of  whi.~h has 
involved concessionary sales  to developing countries und,r the 
famous  Public Law  480  or, more  recently,  sales  to Russia and 
now  China.  Most  of the world's dairy producers  have  also been 
faced with huge  stockpiles.  The  USA  currently hold stocks  of 
about  350,000  tonnes  of skimmed  milk powder. 
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I  say this not to point the finger of blame  at anyone, 
but merely to show  that the  p~riodic growth of  ~ntervent,on 
stocks in the  C~nity  i~ not a  particularly abnormal 
phenomenon,  but something we  have in common  with other 
agricultural exporters.  Furthermore,  for most products  the 
level of stocks even in b~d years  represents  only a  rela~ively 
small part of annual  consumption.  For example,  intervention 
stocks of beef,  even at their peak,  only represented about 20 
days  normal  consumption;  they are now  falling. 
What  is worrying,  howeveT,  is when  the long term  trends 
of production and  consumption get seriously out of line, with 
the result that surpluses,  instead of being periodic phenomena, 
become  a  permanent  feature.  The  Community  producer  then finds 
himself producing  for intervention rather than for  the  m~rket. 
In the memorandum  accompanying its price  proposal~ for 
the coming marketing year,  ~he Commission  has  d~awn parttcular 
attention to this problem,  Which  is now  emerging in a  n~ber of 
sectors.  The  most  prominen~ ~ong these is, of course,  the 
milk secto; where  production  ~ow exceeds  by  nearly 15%  t~e level 
of consumption in non-subsidis~d outlets.  Moreover,  the gap  is 
widening.  Community  milk p;oduction is growing at a  lon~ term 
rate of 1.71·a year.  Human  consumption,  on  the other haqd,  is 
now  falling,  and is forecast to fall further between now  and 
1985 • 
I . 
/The seriousness • 
• 
- s ... 
The  seriousness of this situation is not,  I  think,  as 
widely appreciated as it should be.  This is I  suspect  b~cause 
the eyes  of public opinion tend to be  focused  on  the lev'l of 
intervention stocks  as  beins the outward and visible sign of 
underlying surpluses.  They  see the level of dairy stocks  falling 
from nearly 1.4 million topnes  to a  current level of a  l~ttle 
over 850,000  tonnes,  so they assume  the problem must  be  $oing 
away. 
I  have already argued that the existence of stock$  is 
not in itself proof of an underlying surplus.  I  now  wan~ to 
take the converse of this,  and  argue  that it is possible  to 
have  an underlying surplus without intervention stocks.  The 
true extent of the dairy surplus is the difference between what 
is produced and what  can be sold without a  subsidy.  The  level 
of intervention stocks merely reflects what  cannot be  sold even 
with a  subsidy.  To  this extent the best tangible measure of the 
extent of surpluses is not the level of stocks  but the 
expenditure on subsidies  from  the Community  budget. 
This is obviously a  point of major concern to me  ,s 
Commissioner  for budgets.  Agricultural expenditure  acc~unts  . 
for  three-quarters of the  Community  budget and  the milk  ~ector 
alone consumes  2?%  of the budget,  the major part of it r~lated 
directly to the disposal of s"rpluses.  The  si~e of  thi~ 
expenditure,  though  perhap~ smail  by  comparison with  nat~onal 
.budgets,  has nevertheless  ~ade it very difficult to  deve~op 
satisfactorily other  a~eas of Community  expenditure. 
I  IIJ'he  sums 0 
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The  sums  involved are  v~ry considerable.  In 1977  the 
Community  spent about  £700  million on export refunds  for 
dairy products,  about £125  m!llion on  consumer subsidies for 
butter and nearly £350  ~illlo~ to encourage animal  feed 
compounders  to use skimmed  milk powder.  By  comparison we 
spent only a  little over £200 million on  the Regional  Fu~d 
and £250 million on the Soc:tal  Fund.  This kind of budgetary 
distortion clearly has  to be  remedied. 
It is this  type of consideration,  together with  the 
sheer waste of economic  resources  involved in producing solely 
for intervention - a  point frequently stressed by  my  colleague 
Finn Gundelach - which has  led the Commission  to propose very 
small price increases for the coming year. 
•  .. 
·  . 
I  At  the same 0 
• 
• 
- 7  -
At  the same  time,  the Commission  has  proposed a  nqmber 
of accompanying measures  :Ln  the dairy sector, with a  vie''(  to 
reducing and  absorbing  th~ su~plus.  We  have  proposed  th~ 
continuation of the  corespo~sibility levy.  We  are  r~commending 
the extension with some  imp~ovements of the schemes  for  ~on­
delivery of milk and for  ~e'f conversion.  We  have  propo~ed 
suspending intervention fpr,skimmed ndlk powder  for  the latter 
half Qf  the next milk  yea~ 1  while at the same  time  incre~sing 
the possibilities of  granti~g aid for the use of skimmed  milk 
powder in animal  food.  Considerable publicity has  been  given 
in the UK  to our proposal  to increase the level of aid aqd the 
range of products  qualifying for our school milk  subsidy~  This 
will in our view make  an  impo~tant contribution towards  boosting 
consumption of liquid milk.  Again,  on  the consumption side,  we 
have  earmarked a  further £32  million for cut-price  butte~ sales 
within the Community.  In the short run,  of course,  most of 
these measures will cost large sums  of money.  It is the 
Co~ssion's hope  that,  in the longer run,  they will  con~ribute 
to the removal  of the  dai~y.surplus.  · 
I  Of  ~oursc • 
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Of course the CommissiQn 's proposal for very mode25t 
price increases has  beep attacked on both sides  •  On  the one 
hand,  there have. been those who  say that our proposal  fo~ a 
2%  common  price increase is too low.  This  point of view is 
naturally enough advanced most strongly by representatives of 
those Member  States vbo are unable to give their farmers  price 
increases ·throu,gh  green rate realignments,  for whom  therefore 
the common  price increase is a  maximum  rather than a  minimum. 
These critics point out that the results of the Commission's 
own  objective method indicate  ~at a  price increase of at least 
4.2% is necessary in order for  farm  incomes  to keep  pace with 
incomes  in the rest of the economy. 
-·· 
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There are good  rea$Ons  why  the Commission  has  rej~cted 
this approach.  In the first place,  the so-called "objective" 
method is only a  rough and ready indicator to be used as  a 
starting point,  as  those very same  critics have  bee~ only too 
ready to point out in previous  years when  the results have 
produced figures  which they regarded as  too  low!  Quite apart 
from  the rather crude statistical assumptions  involved,  e.g. 
regarding productivity growth1  the calculation takes no  account 
of the differing economic  environment in agriculture as distinct 
from  other sectors.  The  ag~iQu~tural industry ·is  shelte~ed 
from  the worst effects of the present economic  recession by 
Community  and national  poli~y measures.  Almost  87%  of  g~oss 
agricultural'production i' marketed under  the coverage of a 
comnon  market regulation,  70%  combined with a  common  price 
regime.  Most  basic  agric~l~ral products  benefit from  p~ice 
guarantees  for unlimited  qu~ntities.  They  are protected from 
third country competition by  variable levies and  from  moqetary 
instability through MCAs.  In general,  therefore,  agriculture 
runs  less economic  risk tpan other sectors.  Farmers  are 
unlikely to be  thrown  out of their jobs at short notice 4s  a 
•  result of Japanese competition.  Price guarantees allow farmers 
to safeguard their incomes  to some  extent through increased 
production,  a  possibility which does  not generally exist in 
other economic  sectors - indeed rather the reverse  • 
I  In  a~y case, 0 
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In any case.  as  l  have said,  the objective method ts 
only a  st~rting point,  ~nly oqe  of several factors  to be  taken 
into consideration.  We  41SO  nave to look at the balance pf 
supply and  demand  in the diffel:'ent agricultural markets,  where 
of course there are major difficulties in a  number  of sectors. 
We  have  to consider the budgetary and  re~ource costs.  Prtce 
increases for surplus products  place a  major burden on  th~ 
Community  budget,  becaU$e  the cost of surplus  disposal is 
increased.  We  have to consider the cost to consumers.  It is 
itl the light of these wider considerations  that. the  Commi~sion 
has  taken the view that price increases should on the whole  be 
limited to 2%. 
This  prompts  critics on the other side to ask why  the 
Commission  does  not,  therefore,  propose price reductions,  or 
at least a  price freeze particularly for surplus  product&•  The 
idea of a  price freeze· in the  CAP  is after all nothing new.  It 
was  practised for a  number  of years in succession before the UK 
joined the Community.  Over  the period 1967/68 to 1970/71, 
institutional prices under.  ~he CAP  rose by  a  total of 2.1%  over 
the four years.  The  milk price.did not rise at all.  Y~  may 
wonder why  the  Commission  dqes  not  propo~e more  of the  s~e 
medicine.  The  answer  l~es  ~n what  happened afterwards.  The 
1967/71  farm price free;e  l~d to such a  build•up of  econo~ic 
and political pressure •  inql~ding riots in which people were 
seriously injured - that t.he  dam  finally burst in the  ye~rs 
'1974- 77.  Each year,  t:he  Commission initially proposed fore 
than was  indicated by  the objective method  and  each year the 
Council  adopted a  higher price increase than proposed by  the 
Commission.  This price explosion naturally undid most  of the 
good  achieved by  the previous  freeze. • 
.  . 
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It is to avoid the  ~~petition of such an experience 
that the  Co~ssion  bel~eve~  1~ important to make  proposals 
which,  while very modest,  a~e'pevertheless seen to be  re~listic  •  . 
Just as  the  CAP  cannot affQld  ~o ignore consumers  - who  provide 
the market for what  farmers  p~oduce - neither can it affqrd to 
ignore the  ~nterests of  fa~e~' - who  provide  the  food w'  eat 
and constitute an important s'ctor of society.  Nor  can it 
ignore the budget  constratn~.  The  Commission  has  sought to 
strike a  balance in making  ~t' proposals.  It is a  balanqe which 
I,  as  Budgets  Commission,  find particularly heartening stnce, 
despite the need to spend large sums  of money  on  the  mil~ action 
programme,  it will not lead to a global  inc~ease"in-agricultural 
expenditure this year and will. only require a  very modest 
increase next year,  a  welcome  change  from  the rapid rate of 
increase in the cost of the  CAP  in the recent past  • 